Two major transformations during the colonial period in Southeast Asia served to undermine radically the preexisting social insurance patterns and to violate the moral economy of the subsistence ethic. These were, first, the imposition of what Eric Wolf has called "a particular cultural system, that of North Atlantic capitalism" and, second, the related development of the modern state under a colonial aegis. The transformation of land and labor (that is, nature and human work) into commodities for sale had the most profound impact. Control of land increasingly passed out of the hands of villagers; cultivators progressively lost free usufruct rights and became tenants or agrarian wage laborers; the value of what was produced was increasingly gauged by the fluctuations of an impersonal market.
In a sense, what was happening in Southeast Asia was nothing more than a parochial recapitulation of what Marx had observed in Europe. "But on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire."
Over the past few decades, scholars have, however obliquely and un-selfconsciously, followed Scott in acknowledging the importance of primitive accumulation by highlighting the lingering legacies of state and class formation on contemporary politics in Southeast Asia. Indeed, it is by now a commonplace to note the importance of 'colonial legacies' for determining the parameters of politics in countries ranging from Burma to Malaysia and the Philippines, and to use such 'colonial legacies' as the basis for cross-national comparative analysis within the region. But these exercises in comparative historical sociology have been almost exclusively 'top-down' in approach and emphasis, focusing on the identities and interests of ruling classes and the institutional contexts within which domination, exploitation, and accumulation unfold across Southeast Asia today. Arguably early post-independence 'nation-building' and 'national integration' can be understood as a more recent version of the same kind of transformation. 4 Even today,
we can appreciate the twin imperatives of surplus extraction and social control which face states as they 'see' their hinterlands from various Southeast Asian capitals. and Barrington Moore, Jr. glossed as the 'commercialization of agriculture' can also be understood in the language of Karl Marx as 'primitive accumulation'. This process of expropriation of the means of production was famously depicted by Marx as having been "accomplished by means of the most merciless barbarianism, and under the stimulus of the most infamous, the most sordid, the most petty and the most odious of passions." 5 But beyond this moral condemnation, Marx also identified primitive accumulation as an historical necessity for the emergence and evolution of capitalism as a mode of production. For capitalist relations to reproduce themselves through the 'silent compulsion' of the market, a preceding phase of 'primitive accumulation' was required to commodify land and labor, and to create a 'reserve army' of 'surplus labor'. Such a process of dispossession required direct application of coercion and violence, reflecting the pretensions of capital in its embryonic state, in its state of becoming, when it cannot yet use the sheer force of economic relations to secure its right to absorb a sufficient quantity of surplus labor, but must be aided by the power of the state….Centuries are required before the 'free' worker, owing to the greater development of the capitalist mode of production, makes a voluntary agreement, i.e. is compelled by social conditions to sell the whole of his active life.
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The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance. The constant generation of a relative surplus population keeps the law of the supply and demand of labor, and therefore wages, within narrow limits which correspond to capital's valorization requirements. The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases. In the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the 'natural laws of production,' i.e. it is possible to rely on his dependence on capital, which springs from the conditions of production themselves, and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them. It is otherwise during the historical genesis of capitalist production. The rising bourgeoisie needs the power of the state, and uses it to 'regulate' wages, i.e. to force them into the limits suitable to make a profit, to lengthen the working day, and to keep the worker himself at his normal level of dependence. This is an essential aspect of so-called primitive accumulation. Thailand. 23 Finally, if we turn to the pattern of primitive accumulation which crystallized on Java and parts of Sumatra over the nineteenth century, we find an especially complex set of distinctive and significant legacies still haunting Indonesia today.
Here, three distinctive features of primitive accumulation in the Indonesian archipelago are especially worthy of note. First of all, as is well known, the commodification of land and labor on Java and elsewhere unfolded in considerable measure through forms of market mediation largely controlled by immigrant merchants whose 'Chinese' ancestry served as the basis for segregation and stigmatization as 'foreign', in contrast with the processes of assimilation and integration observed in Siam and the Philippines. As the Javanese aristocracy -and its 'native' counterparts elsewhere in the archipelago -remained at one arm's length from the workings of the market, capital accumulation thus remained problematically 'foreign' in ways virtually unparalleled elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 24 Secondly, more than any other colony in Southeast Asia, the administration of the Netherlands East Indies depended heavily on the strengthening of village institutions, which were understood by Dutch officials to have enjoyed considerable 'traditional' depth and strength, and were consequently relied upon, reinforced, and reinvented as the bases for political control and economic extraction. 25 Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, moreover, Dutch colonial scholars of 'customary' or adat law, most notably those coming out of the adatrecht school in Leiden, began to systematize adat law and reified adat institutions, so that through the 'invention of tradition' a desa adat or customary village emerged as a supposedly "autonomous, corporate village community -the ideal-type dorpsrepubliek." 26 Thus revisionist scholars have concluded that "the village as a corporate, autonomous and territorially defined unit was in a certain sense a creation of intensified colonial rule in the early nineteenth century." 27 The strength of community boundaries created by Dutch administrative policies was further enhanced by colonial reliance on the village as the essential unit for economic extraction, most notably in the clove monopoly in the Moluccas and under the Cultivation System of forced extractions of sugar, coffee, and other cash crops in Java. While some pre-colonial villages had strongly established patterns of communal land tenure and labor-sharing schemes, 28 colonial-era villages in the Netherlands Indies more widely and insistently relied on communal cultivation of various export crops and the rotation and apportionment of land and labor at the village level. 29 Significantly, moreover, the colonial regime erected considerable barriers to the alienation of land to non-villagers and left considerable landholdings in the realm of village control, whether in the form of communal lands or the salary lands (tanah bengkok) awarded to village officials. 30 In short, if the essential dimensions of community strength are "the mechanisms of authoritative control and jurisdiction of membership, the channels of discursive focus that establish a folklore of place, and the forms of economic cooperation that underpin membership claims to local subsistence," then certainly Dutch policies created strong notions of community when compared to colonial-era villages elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 31 System of the mid-nineteenth century forced the peasantry into a complex web of relations of production unparalleled in their intensity in Southeast Asia at the time.
The Cultivation System awarded collective ownership of land to villages and assigned villagers collective responsibility for payment of land taxes (landrente). These obligations, as well as restrictions on mobility, tied Javanese peasants to their villages, which "were reorganized both to emphasize the uniform obligation of all village members and to facilitate supervision." 33 After the passage of the Agrarian Law of 1870, and with the dawning of the Ethical Policy in the early 1900s, this pattern was preserved through contracts between Javanese villages and European estates. 34 Third and finally, primitive accumulation in the Indonesian archipelago unfolded in ways which forced an unusually early proletarianization of the peasantry, especially on Java. The deepening incorporation of the Indonesian archipelago within the world economy over the course of the nineteenth century entailed advanced forms of exploitation in commercial agriculture, commodity processing, and natural resource exploitation, as well as the elaboration of a modern transportation network, creating a sizeable class of wage laborers. By 1900, some 435,000 hectares were leased out to large private estates on Java, 35 and connected through sugar mills and railroads to port cities like Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya, which hosted more than 150,000 residents by the turn of the twentieth century. 36 By 1900 Java was the most technologically modern and integrated economy between Bengal and Japan. The technology of the Industrial Revolution had been applied to a network of transport and communications, to an exportoriented sugar milling industry with giant factories commanding most of the best land on the island, to irrigation systems, to ancillary metal-working and heavy engineering industries, to the production of some urban middle-class consumer goods such as bread, soft drinks and ice, to construction materials such as bricks and timber to public utilities such as gas and power. Excluding the tiny urban islands of Singapore and Penang, there was nowhere else like it in Southeast Asia. 37 The construction of a modern infrastructure for intensive export-oriented agricultural production continued apace well into the twentieth century. By 1942, there were 1.3 million hectares of irrigated rice fields, thousands of kilometers of asphalted, and metalled roads, and 5,500 kilometers of railway line on Java. 38 From the mid-nineteenth century forward, a similarly modern infrastructure was extended to various parts of the other islands of the Indonesian archipelago. By 1900, some 370,000 hectares of land outside Java were held by private estates, with nearly another plus another 480,000 under various kinds of concessions; by the 1920s, there were 500,000 hectares under concession in North Sumatra alone, with private estates across the entirety of the archipelago claiming nearly 3 million hectares of land. 39 Enclaves of concentrated, and heavily capitalized, production dotted the landscape: a vast plantation belt along the eastern coast of Sumatra, tin mines on the islands of Bangka and Belitung, coal mines in West Sumatra, oil refineries in Borneo, and scattered mines and plantations elsewhere. Most notable was the so-called 'Deli belt' of plantations on the eastern coast of Sumatra:
By 1930 more than 11,000 Europeans were living on the East Coast, directly or indirectly involved in the estate industry. For the first time, personnel, capital, sites of production, and processing plants drawn from, or situated in, different parts of the Western and colonized worlds were pulled together under single, but notably distinct, corporate structures. 40 Overall, compared to the Philippines and much of the rest of Southeast Asia at the turn of the twentieth century, the Netherlands East Indies was distinguished by the relatively early emergence of a class of wage laborers concentrated in large-scale agricultural production and processing and key nodes of modern transport. By 1930, an estimated 300,000 coolie laborers were toiling on the plantations of East Sumatra, and nearly 250,000 more were to be found working on large plantations and mines elsewhere in the Outer Islands. 41 On Java, sizeable concentrations of laborers were likewise to be found, and not only on the plantations: historians have estimated that industrial workers numbered nearly 250,000 by 1942, with an additional 50,000 laboring on the railways, and many thousands more in the harbors of Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya, and on the steamboats plying interisland and international routes from these ports. 42 These distinctive features of primitive accumulation as it unfolded in the Netherlands East Indies have had enduring consequences for capitalist development and political change in Indonesia. Aside from Tonkin, with its own history of agricultural involution, immiseration, and early 'export' of proletarianized peasant labor, nowhere else in Southeast Asia has seen such a history of collective action, mass mobilization, and popular radicalism as that witnessed on Java and in other areas of the Indonesian archipelago. 43 In the Sarekat Islam of the 1910s and early 1920s, Southeast Asia saw its first large-scale mass popular movement, unparalleled in extent elsewhere in the region, and in the Partai Komunis Indonesia, we likewise find the first Communist Party in Asia. 44 In the Revolusi of the early postwar era, we can observe a struggle for independence notable for the intensity and diversity of autonomous local popular mobilization, including many local 'social revolutions' across areas of Java and Sumatra, and in the early aftermath of Independence, we see political parties more diverse and collectivist in their identities and forms of voter mobilization than found anywhere else in Southeast Asia. tribute to Scott's work, and a highly derivative kind of argument for the continuing importance of aspects of politics which Scott has done more than any other scholar to illuminate over the years. But perhaps at least it does so in ways which might speak
